The Logic of Political Survival Free download Ì 108

The Logic of Political Survival

review The Logic of Political Survival

The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political uestion why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption war and misery endure Considering this political puzzle they also answer the related economic uestion of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not The authors construct a provo. Brilliant academic reading of how bad behavior is almost always the right choice for politiciansthe academic version on which The Dictator's Handbook is based Highly Recommendedeven for Lefties ; Le Triomphe de la République - 1871-1914 of this ambitious book address a fundamental political uestion why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned La République radicale (1898-1914) out Caulaincourt : Diplomate de Napoléon of Le colonel Mayer - De l'affaire Dreyfus à de Gaulle office while those who preside Les Français sous le Second Empire over corruption war and misery endure Considering this political puzzle they also answer the related economic uestion Souvenirs : 1859-1871 of why some countries experience successful economic development and 1812 : La campagne tragique de Napoléon en Russie others do not The authors construct a provo. Brilliant academic reading Les Trois Cents Jours de Napoléon à l'île d'Elbe of how bad behavior is almost always the right choice for politiciansthe academic version Joséphine : vie de l'impératrice on which The Dictator's Handbook is based Highly Recommendedeven for Lefties ;

Summary Ô eBook, ePUB or Kindle PDF ✓ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita

Cative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy They also extend the model to explain the conseuences of war on political survival Throughout the book they provid. I first read this book as a first semester graduate student in an IR and Comparative hybrid course At the time I didn't totally understand it the methodology the terminology practically all of it was beyond my comprehension at that point However I just picked up The Logic of Political Survival and reviewed it for comprehensive exams I found this book absolutely invaluable to the understanding of both the demoratic peace theory and political institution building The selectorate model proposed by BDM et al is absolutely comprehensive and seems almost without rival It just explains so much and yet is inevitably so simple This is a must read for any comparative politics or international relations scholar and come to think of it could very well be applied to public administration political theory or American politics as well BDM et al make a convincing case for structural arguments of both comparative politics and the democratic peace which in my opinion are without parallel Les Français sous le Second Empire on the selection Souvenirs : 1859-1871 of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy They also extend the model to explain the conseuences 1812 : La campagne tragique de Napoléon en Russie of war Les Trois Cents Jours de Napoléon à l'île d'Elbe on political survival Throughout the book they provid. I first read this book as a first semester graduate student in an IR and Comparative hybrid course At the time I didn't totally understand it the methodology the terminology practically all Joséphine : vie de l'impératrice of it was beyond my comprehension at that point However I just picked up The Logic Mémoires inédits: Les Cahiers Rouges of Political Survival and reviewed it for comprehensive exams I found this book absolutely invaluable to the understanding La Moskowa - Borodino- La bataille des Redoutes of both the demoratic peace theory and political institution building The selectorate model proposed by BDM et al is absolutely comprehensive and seems almost without rival It just explains so much and yet is inevitably so simple This is a must read for any comparative politics Napoléon III et Franceschini Pietri or international relations scholar and come to think La commune de Paris par ceux qui l'ont vécue of it could very well be applied to public administration political theory Surcouf or American politics as well BDM et al make a convincing case for structural arguments Alfred Dreyfus :Cinq années de ma vie : 1894-1899 of both comparative politics and the democratic peace which in my L'art militaire de Napoléon opinion are without parallel

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita ✓ 8 Free download

E illustrations from history ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France and test the model against statistics gathered from cross national data The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically. KOBOBOOKS Lannes (1769-1809) maréchal de Napoléon : Colloque Maisons-Laffitte, 18 mars 2017 on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically. KOBOBOOKS


7 thoughts on “The Logic of Political Survival

  1. says:

    Brilliant academic reading of how bad behavior is almost always the right choice for politiciansthe academic version on which The Dictator's Handbook is based Highly Recommendedeven for Lefties ;


  2. says:

    This 2003 treatise divided into three consecutive constructive parts presents theories of governance and political survival depicts a series of hypothesis theories and arguments Their ideas formulate that since political survival depends on followers’ support one puzzle they propose several is what keeps autocratic leaders who often than not bring less security and prosperity to their constituents than their democratic counterparts longer in power than the last ones; In other words oftenbut not always bad policies boost political survival Their findings contribute to multiple fields IR Comparative Politics War Studies Political Economics Sociology of Organizations etc but this complicates the digestion of the material They discuss works such as Hobbes’ Leviathan or The Matter Form and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil and Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy to sustain their theories; ie “Our theory challenges Hobbes’s view that an absolute sovereign the Leviathan is the best form of governance while also probing and uestioning the perspectives of Machiavelli about the virtues of republics” Bruce Bueno de Mesuita Alastair Smith Randolph Siverson and James Morrow 2003 xi By doing so they miss many other interpretations of what makes up good governance practices They apply a mathematical statistical method to test their ideasBy building on Hobbes observation as cited in Bueno de Mesuita et al 2003 that life in the state of nature is “solitary poore nasty brutish and short” Hobbes 1651 1996 chap 13 p89 and on Machiavelli’s idea that “individual liberty provided by a republic over the corruption of monarchy” Bueno de Mesuita et al 2003 3 is preferable the authors address several puzzles The top 3 1 Democrats offer their citizens peace and by some accounts prosperity than autocrats Yet autocrats last in office about twice as long on average as do democrats Why is this so? Bueno de Mesuita et al 2003 5 Problem Not always When? Where? Components of exceptionalism?2 Why would any authoritarian state adopt universal adult suffrage as part of its political system? Bueno de Mesuita et al 2003 6 uestion is “why not” when history in particular cases such as the ones they mention shows that authoritarianism lead to misery3 Can the choice to produce peace and prosperity or war and misery be shown to follow from the same factors that influence preferences for government institutions and the time leaders survive in office? Bueno de Mesuita et al 2003 7 Good uestion however particularity of cases with positive and negative answers could applyTwo pillar ideas are those of the selectorate and of the winning coalitions which they elaborate on under the theory of the selectorate one of several addressed According to their findings a winning coalition of supporters is at the base of political survival however the size considered in their research and form less mentioned of that coalition affects the political economical formula of governance policies and institutions One problem is that the authors consider S the selectorate as an internal factor of the organisation of the nation state however they do not address the case in which key actors do not correspond to such consideration “We define the selectorate as the set of people whose endowments include the ualities institutionally reuired to choose the government’s leadership” and “All selectorate members within a polity therefore share certain common characteristics” Bueno de Mesuita 2003 42 The only scenario in which they include the “external” actor is when they consider war Argument “Political leaders need to hold office to accomplish any goal Every leader answers to some group that keeps her in power her winning coalition” Bueno de Mesuita 2003 p 7 One problem is that the authors consider three kinds of decisions for the leaders to keep in power however the three of them are institutional and economical taxation material benefits and in instances leaders act out of them What about governance by fear division inclusion exclusion psychographic distribution of strategies etc? By this observation the second part of the book can be flawed Argument in a democracy W winning coalitions are large whilst in autocracies winning coalitions are small both cases in relation to the size of S; Not necessarily The work misses that there is no such thing as an absolute democracy or absolute autocracy; in pragmatic terms there are only tones of greys in terms of regimes Same case when the authors speak of weak and strong bonds between Lleader RResidents S W Relativity should come into play Argument A smaller W favours kleptocracy Again democracies do not reuire spending “” in a large W to keep in power since the first can resort to other means to prolong the stay of the leader in a favourable position An example is the US as I write which in the past fitted the argument; deregulation of markets less taxation a decrease of the welfare state etc is the paradigm Another example is the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico from 1929 to 2000 the PRI was “the perfect dictatorship under a democratic regime”When the authors discuss the role of the IMF and of the World Bank in bailing out governments leaders out of financial crisis they imply that the problem is that by doing that these institutions obstruct reform and foster corruption however they fail to place these trans governmental institutions as an active part of S which would mean that S influence can be observed from perspectives than indicated The case selection seems to be made to favour the conclusions of the research and not to justify the general application of the theory; since the cited examples “fit” the arguments hypothesis and theories they fail to show general operationalisation of the work as represented in some of the mentioned examples This is particularly applicable in the extension of the work towards war ie the hypothesis that “Defeat in war increases the odds that a leader will be deposed” and “This risk is much higher if the defeated leader heads a large coalition polity” Bueno de Mesuita 2003 455 applies well to the cited example of the Anglo Soviet invasion of Iran Benito Mussolini and even Francisco Franco examples but fails to stand in the cases of Napoléon Bonaparte and other leaders in which defeat turned into victory at some pointsIn conclusion this work is as contributing as the limits imposed by the authors of the study Within these demarcations variables this book answers than satisfactory to the posed puzzles however its generalisation and applicability comes into uestion because of the same reasons Perhaps political survival is a case by case an object of study and that the essence of strategy is precisely the adaptation of different courses of action according to multiple factors which depends on time and space of occurrence


  3. says:

    Eh I guess it is worth 4 stars because I can't think of a reason to give it 3 stars although it isn't earth shattering if you know what I mean


  4. says:

    I first read this book as a first semester graduate student in an IR and Comparative hybrid course At the time I didn't totally understand it the methodology the terminology practically all of it was beyond my comprehension at that point However I just picked up The Logic of Political Survival and reviewed it for comprehensive exams I found this book absolutely invaluable to the understanding of both the demoratic peace theory and political institution building The selectorate model proposed by BDM et al is absolutely comprehensive and seems almost without rival It just explains so much and yet is inevitably so simple This is a must read for any comparative politics or international relations scholar and come to think of it could very well be applied to public administration political theory or American politics as well BDM et al make a convincing case for structural arguments of both comparative politics and the democratic peace which in my opinion are without parallel


  5. says:

    A classic rational choice manifesto on state leadership and behavior Bad leaders tend to be successful than good ones The evidence is based on a formal model called selectorate theory A good read but obviously unspecified as a model Wouldn't be surprised if his results were considered spurious within the next ten years


  6. says:

    KOBOBOOKS


  7. says:

    Excellent comprehensive theory of conflict and war I don't buy it completely but its rationality is incredibly thorough